“[P]ersons who have engaged in a joint venture to purchase property in which they reside, are entitled to seek a partition” when “their joint enterprise comes to an end . . . irrespective of how title is formally held.” Mitchell v. Oksienik, 380 N.J. Super. 119, 127 (App. Div. 2005). “Among the remedies available on partition — where other modes of relief are not practical — is a forced sale of the property and division of the net proceeds between the parties.” Id. at 128.

However, where an agreement exists between an unmarried couple giving one party “a continued right to occupy . . . the jointly-owned home,” “a partition by way of sale to third parties is not an appropriate remedy.” Olson v. Stevens, 322 N.J. Super. 119, 123 (App. Div. 1999). “Agreements about property jointly held by cohabitants are material in actions concerning its division” and “may be specifically enforced when that remedy is appropriate.” Houseman v. Dare, 405 N.J. Super. 538, 545-46 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Olson, supra, 322 N.J. Super. at 123). Unmarried couples “remain free to enter into valid and enforceable agreements concerning . . . property rights.” Kozlowski, supra, 80 N.J. at 389 (Pashman, J., concurring).

Further, while a non-married individual may not assert a claim for equitable distribution of individually-owned assets because “equitable distribution is awarded only in actions for divorce,” Connell v. Diehl, 397 N.J. Super. 477, 496 (App. Div.) (quoting Kozlowski, supra, 80 N.J. at 383), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 518 (2008), where the home is a “substantial asset,” the “determination of . . . support pursuant to the alleged [palimony] agreement . . . may impact on the ownership and occupancy of the house.” Olson, supra, 322 N.J. Super. at 123. Therefore, “[a]s a matter of judicial economy, all issues between the parties should be resolved in [one proceeding], including disputes over entitlement to property, as long as actual notice is provided as to the specific relief sought.” Mitchell, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 131.

NOTE: My legal and mediation services are offered to clients in Fanwood 07023; Garwood 07027; Kenilworth 07033; Mountainside 07092; New Providence 07974; Roselle Park 07204; Roselle 07203; Elizabeth 07201; Linden 07036; Plainfield 07060; Rahway 07065; Summit 07901; Westfield 07090; Berkeley Heights 07922; Clark 07066; Cranford 07016; Hillside 07205; Scotch Plains 07076; Springfield 07081; Union 07083; Winfield; Carteret 07008; Dunellen 08812; East Brunswick 08816; Edison 08817; Jamesburg 08831; Metuchen 08840; New Brunswick 08901; Old Bridge 08857; Perth Amboy 08861; Sayreville 08871; South Amboy 08878; South River 08877; Avenel 07001; Colonia 07067; Iselin 08830; Woodbridge 07095; Somerset 08873; Somerville 08876 and Watchung 07069, New Jersey.

Persons who have engaged in a joint venture to purchase property in which they reside, are entitled to seek a partition when their joint enterprise comes to an end, irrespective of how title is formally held originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on April 26, 2011.

Decisional law steadfastly holds that where an attorney fails to discover a lien in connection with a title search, the attorney is liable for the amount of the lien. Hoppe, supra, 158 N.J. Super. at 164; see also Bayerl v. Smyth, 117 N.J.L. 412 (E. & A. 1937) (holding that the measure of damages due from an attorney to his client for negligence in passing as clear a title encumbered with liens is the amount necessary to pay off the liens); Jacobsen v. Peterson, 91 N.J.L. 404 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (in an action against an attorney who negligently omits to report a judgment lien upon real estate, where the client purchases such real estate in reliance upon the report without knowledge of such judgment, the measure of damages is the amount paid to remove the lien), aff’d, 92 N.J.L. 631 (E. & A. 1918).

As noted in Bayerl:

And even if the client sells the property at a higher price than he paid for it, including the amount of a judgment negligently overlooked by his attorney, such fact will not save the attorney from liability to his client for the amount of the judgment.

[Id. at 415.]

NOTE: My legal and mediation services are offered to clients in Union, Middlesex, Somerset, Essex, Hudson, Bergen, and Morris counties in NJ.

Where an attorney fails to discover a lien in connection with a title search, the attorney is liable for the amount of the lien originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on February 25, 2011.

The remedy of equitable distribution provides a judicial division of marital property relative to the contributions of each spouse during the marriage, and is available only upon entry of a judgment of divorce. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1; see also Mendell v. Mendell, 162 N.J. Super. 469, 476 (App. Div. 1978).

Equitable distribution is inapplicable in a matter involving unmarried parties, despite the extent of their cohabitation.

However, “joint venturers . . . are entitled to seek a partition of their property when their joint enterprise comes to an end, irrespective of how title is formally held.” Mitchell v. Oksienik, 380 N.J. Super. 119, 127 (App. Div. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Swartz v. Becker, 246 N.J. Super. 406, 412 (App. Div. 1991) (stating “[p]artition sales may be ordered if it is found that the property is so situated that it is not suitable for division”). “[F]ormal written agreements are not necessary for a joint enterprise to exist.” Mitchell, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 129.

The equitable remedy of partition provides for equal division of joint property, including assets held by tenants in common. Aronow v. Silver, 223 N.J. Super. 344, 352-53 (Ch. Div. 1987). “Partition is subject to the rule of owelty, which ensures that ‘one cotenant receiv[ing] property with a value greater than his proportionate share, [] will owe to the other cotenant an amount of money which would equalize the partition.’” Id. at 353 (quoting Leonard v. Leonard, 124 N.J. Super. 439, 442-43 (App. Div. 1973)).

A court has broad discretion in shaping partition relief:

It is an established principle that a court of equity, in decreeing partition, does not act ministerially and in obedience to the call of those who have a right to the partition, but founds itself on its general jurisdiction as a court of equity, and administers its relief . . . according to its own notions of general justice and equity between the parties.

[Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 263 (1976) (quoting Woolston v. Pullen, 88 N.J. Eq. 35, 40 (Ch. 1917)).]

The method of partition is left to the trial court’s discretion in order to reach the most equitable allocation. See Newman, supra, 70 N.J. at 263.

NOTE: This Blog/Blawg, NJ Family Issues, is managed by Paul G. Kostro, Esq., an attorney/lawyer/mediator in Linden, Union County, New Jersey.

Equitable distribution is inapplicable in a matter involving unmarried parties, despite the extent of their cohabitation; however, joint venturers are entitled to seek a partition of their property when their joint enterprise comes to an end, irrespective of how title is formally held originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on August 27, 2010.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-6, “[e]very person having any right or title of entry into real estate shall make such entry within 20 years next after the accrual of such right or title of entry, or be barred therefrom thereafter.”

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-31, adverse possession of developed real estate triggers not only a right of entry, but “title in the actual possessor and occupier of all such real estate.” See also J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 500 (2001).

An “entry and possession [of land] for the required time which is exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, visible and notorious, even though under mistaken claim of title, is sufficient to support a claim of title by adverse possession.” Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 386-87 (1969); see also Stump v. Whibco, 314 N.J. Super. 560, 576 (App. Div. 1998).

Although the fencing of land is usually indicative of an assertion of ownership, not all fenced encroachments support a finding of adverse possession. A “minor encroachment,” i.e., “an intrusion so small that it cannot easily be detected without a survey,” is insufficient to support a claim of adverse possession. Stump, supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 577. When an encroachment is so small that it is not obvious without a survey, “it cannot be presumed that the true owner is aware of it.” Ibid. The Supreme Court underscored the “minor encroachment” exception in Mannillo, supra.

NOTE: My legal and mediation services are offered to clients in Fanwood 07023; Garwood 07027; Kenilworth 07033; Mountainside 07092; New Providence 07974; Roselle Park 07204; Roselle 07203; Elizabeth 07201; Linden 07036; Plainfield 07060; Rahway 07065; Summit 07901; Westfield 07090; Berkeley Heights 07922; Clark 07066; Cranford 07016; Hillside 07205; Scotch Plains 07076; Springfield 07081; Union 07083; Winfield; Carteret 07008; Dunellen 08812; East Brunswick 08816; Edison 08817; Jamesburg 08831; Metuchen 08840; New Brunswick 08901; Old Bridge 08857; Perth Amboy 08861; Sayreville 08871; South Amboy 08878; South River 08877; Avenel 07001; Colonia 07067; Iselin 08830; Woodbridge 07095; Somerset 08873; Somerville 08876 and Watchung 07069, New Jersey.

Adverse possession originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on August 23, 2010.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 25:1-11a (the Statute of Frauds):

[a] transaction intended to transfer an interest in real estate shall not be effective to transfer ownership of the interest unless:
(1) a description of the real estate sufficient to identify it, the nature of the interest, the fact of the transfer and the identity of the transferor and the transferee are established in a writing signed by or on behalf of the transferor[.]

NOTE: My legal services include family law, divorce, child support, litigation, arbitration, mediation, child custody and visitation, alimony, equitable distribution, separation agreements, palimony, PSA, property settlement agreement, premarital and prenuptial agreements, midmarriage and marital agreements.

The Statute of Frauds originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on August 23, 2010.

The competed Form L-9 and attachments should be forwarded to the NJ Division of Taxation, Inheritance and Estate Tax, PO Box 249, Trenton, NJ 08695-0249.

Additional information pertaining to the use of Form L-9 may be obtained by calling the Inheritance and Estate Tax Section at 609-292-5033.

NOTE: My Law Office is located at 726 West Saint Georges [W. St. Georges] Avenue (Route 27), Linden, Union County, NJ. Telephone: 908-486-2200; EM@IL

N.J. Form L-9 is an affidavit requesting the issuance of a tax waiver for real property located in New Jersey which was held by a resident decedent originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on July 22, 2010.

Property owners have a duty to make sure that their

property taxes are paid. The validity of any tax or assessment, or the time at which it shall be payable, shall not be affected by the failure of a taxpayer to receive a tax bill, but every taxpayer is put on notice to ascertain from the proper official of the taxing district the amount which may be due for taxes or assessments against him or his property.

[N.J.S.A. 54:4-64(a)(3).]

The Tax Sale Law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-1 to -137, provides a mechanism for individuals or entities to purchase tax liens from municipalities and initiate foreclosure actions against property owners who are delinquent in paying their property taxes. The foreclosure process begins when a property owner fails to pay the property taxes, as the unpaid balance becomes a municipal lien on the property. N.J.S.A. 54:5-6. “When unpaid taxes or any municipal lien . . . remains in arrears on the 11th day of the eleventh month of the fiscal year when the taxes or lien became in arrears, the collector . . . shall enforce the lien by selling the property[.]” N.J.S.A. 54:5-19. Upon completion of the sale, a certificate of tax sale is issued to the purchaser. N.J.S.A. 54:5-46.

A tax foreclosure sale is subject to redemption. N.J.S.A. 54:5-32. If the certificate is not redeemed within two years from the date of the tax sale, the certificate holder can file an in personam foreclosure action to bar the right of redemption. N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a). Prior thereto, the certificate holder must, through a “title search of the public record,” identify “any lienholder or other persons and entities with an interest in the property that is subject to foreclosure[,]” who then must be named as defendants in the action and served with the foreclosure complaint. R. 4:64-1(a).

If the defendants fail to plead or otherwise defend, Rule 4:64-1(c), “the court . . . shall enter an order fixing the amount, time and place for redemption upon proof establishing the amount due.” R. 4:64-1(f). The order must then be served on each defendant. Ibid. Thereafter, “[t]he court, on notice to all appearing parties including parties whose answers have been stricken, may enter final judgment upon proof of service of the order of redemption . . . and the filing by plaintiff of an affidavit of non-redemption.” Ibid.

Owners or occupants of the property who may have the right to redeem must exercise that right by paying the delinquent taxes before the time to redeem has been cut off. N.J.S.A. 54:5-54. The right to redeem continues “until barred by the judgment of the Superior Court.” N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a). However, “the express policy of the [Tax Sale Law] is that it be liberally constructed so as to bar the right of redemption, not preserve it, the goal being that marketable titles to property be secured.” Malone v. Midlantic Bank, N.A., 334 N.J. Super. 238, 250 (Ch. Div. 1999) (citing N.J.S.A. 54:5-85), aff’d o.b., 334 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 2000). “Since the redemption provisions of the Tax Sale Law must be viewed with that goal in mind, N.J.S.A. 54:5-54 should not be read to support a right of redemption in” occupants who have no enforceable lease. Id. at 250. “This is particularly true, when . . . the owner has forfeited his interest in the property” due to his failure to record his deed prior to the entry of a final tax foreclosure judgment. Ibid.

The judgment entered is final, “and no application shall be entertained to reopen the judgment after three months from the date thereof, and then only upon the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the conduct of the suit.” N.J.S.A. 54:5-87; see also N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.67.

In any action to foreclose the right of redemption in any property sold for unpaid taxes or other municipal liens, all persons claiming an interest in or an encumbrance or lien upon such property, by or through any conveyance, mortgage, assignment, lien or any instrument which, by any provision of law, could be recorded, registered, entered or filed in any public office in this State, and which shall not be so recorded, registered, entered or filed at the time of the filing of the complaint in such action shall be bound by the proceedings in the action so far as such property is concerned, in the same manner as if he had been made a party to and appeared in such action, and the judgment therein had been made against him as one of the defendants therein.

[N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1.]

The judgment vests in the plaintiff “an absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple in the land[.]” N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.64.

However, because the real estate owner had no recorded deed, they were not entitled to service of process, and they are bound by the final judgment. In an in personam tax foreclosure action, Rule 4:64-1(a) only requires the certificate holder to search the public records to ascertain the identity of persons with an interest in the property. This is what the Legislature intended in the TSL as well, as N.J.S.A. 5:5-89.1 binds to a final tax foreclosure judgment all persons claiming an interest in the foreclosed property who had an unrecorded deed. There is no authority requiring the certificate holder to inspect the property, or do anything else, to ascertain the identity of persons claiming an interest thereto.

Purchasers who acquire property from one who has gained title through a tax sale foreclosure have a duty to “ascertain, in advance,” who was in possession of it. Michalski v. United States, 49 N.J. Super. 104, 108 (Ch. Div. 1958). I.E.’s, L.L.C. v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520, 535 (Law Div. 2006). Such a purchaser “has a duty to make reasonable and diligent inquiry of the rights to the property by those in possession.” Ibid.

NOTE: My Law Office is located at 726 West Saint Georges [W. St. Georges] Avenue (Route 27), Linden, Union County, NJ. Telephone: 908-486-2200; EM@IL

If you have an unrecorded Deed, it may not save your house from foreclosure originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on July 21, 2010.

The old rule, upheld most recently in Yanhko v. Fane, 70 N.J. 528 (1976), that all property owners abutting a sidewalk were immune from liability, was partially overruled in Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 149 (1981). In overruling Yanhko, the Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff has a cause of action against a commercial property owner for injuries sustained on a deteriorated sidewalk abutting that commercial property when that owner negligently fails to maintain the sidewalk in reasonably good condition.” Ibid.

This holding was based on the premise that imposing a duty to maintain sidewalks on commercial owners was particularly compelling. Id. at 157-59. In so finding, the Court noted:

[f]or the protection of its patrons, every commercial establishment must maintain its premises, including means of ingress and egress, in reasonably safe condition. And although the paved sidewalks fronting a commercial establishment are primarily for the use of the public generally, their condition is so beneficially related to the operation of the business that the unrestricted legal duty of maintaining them in good repair might, arguably, be placed on it.

[Id. at 159.]

As for determining which properties were to be covered by the new rule, the Court held that “commonly accepted definitions of commercial and residential property should apply, with difficult cases to be decided as they arise.” Id. at 160. Apartment complexes were characterized as “commercial” properties and thus Stewart liability applies. Id. at 160 n.7.

The holding in Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 149, was subsequently extended to include commercial landowners who unreasonably fail to remove snow and ice from the abutting sidewalk after actual or constructive notice. Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 92 N.J. 390, 395-96 (1983). Moreover, we have addressed whether a property is commercial or residential for purposes of sidewalk liability since the decision in Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 149. For instance, in Abraham v. Gupta, 281 N.J. Super. 81, 85 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 455 (1995), we summarized the manner in which courts should decide this issue:

[l]iability is imposed upon the owner of a profit, or not-for-profit enterprise, regardless of whether the enterprise is in fact profitable. It is the capacity to generate income which is the key. In part, liability is imposed because of the benefits the entrepreneur derives from providing a safe and convenient access for its patrons. Secondly, such an enterprise has the capacity to spread the risk of loss arising from injuries on abutting sidewalks, either through the purchase of commercial liability policies or “through higher charges for the commercial enterprise’s goods and services.”

[Ibid. (quoting Mirza, supra, 92 N.J. at 397).]

Thus, if the property is owned for investment or business purposes, the property is classified as commercial and public sidewalk liability applies. Dupree v. City of Clifton, 351 N.J. Super. 237, 242 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d o.b., 175 N.J. 449 (2003). Such is the case where the property was a non-owneroccupied two-family house that was leased to separate tenants. Hambright v. Yglesias, 200 N.J. Super. 392, 395 (App. Div. 1985). In extending liability, the court in Hambright specifically noted that the Supreme Court “made it clear that it was the nature of the ownership that mattered, not the use to which the property is put.” Ibid.

Further, in Brown v. St. Venantius School, 111 N.J. 325 (1988), the Court held that a parochial school was commercial for purposes of sidewalk liability. Id. at 338. The Law Division likewise extended sidewalk liability to a fraternity house because it was used not only as a residence for college students, but also as a social club for members and alumni who did not reside on the premises. Gilhooly v. Zeta Psi Fraternity, 243 N.J. Super. 201, 207-08 (Law Div. 1990). Relying on Brown, supra, 111 N.J. at 338, the Law Division concluded that “where property is partially commercial and partially noncommercial[,] the former will take precedence in the application of the rule in Stewart.” Gilhooly, supra, 243 N.J. Super. at 205.

However, in Avallone v. Mortimer, 252 N.J. Super. 434, 437 (App. Div. 1991), we concluded that “the Gilhooly approach to hybrid residential/non-residential properties partially misinterpreted the Brown rationale,” stating:

[a]s we read Brown, its weighing of policy considerations was ultimately resolved entirely on the grounds that there simply was no residential use of the property, and that its charitable use was not crucial in balancing the interests of the injured party against that of the abutting owner except as to a beneficiary of the charity.

[Ibid.]

The property there was characterized as a hybrid property because the owner resided in his multi-family residence, although a portion of the residence was leased as a residential apartment. Id. at 435-36. In determining how to characterize the property, we relied on the balancing approach found in the policy considerations set forth in Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 154-57, and Brown, supra, 111 N.J. at 332-35, resulting in our conclusion that:

[c]ommercial and other non-residential entities are more readily able to pass on to their users the added costs associated with sidewalk liability. This rationale includes owners of apartment houses and of non-owneroccupied smaller residential buildings operated for revenue purposes.

[Id. at 437-38.]

The court then held “that the same applicable considerations of balance and ability to pass along cost require that the residential sidewalk exception be continued for owner-occupants whose residency is established to be the predominant use.” Id. at 438.

Accordingly, Stewart liability was not imposed where the owners resided in one apartment within their three-family residence and other family members resided in the other two apartments despite the owners receiving rent. Borges v. Hamed, 247 N.J. Super. 295, 296 (App. Div. 1991). Likewise, in Smith v. Young, 300 N.J. Super. 82, 84 (App. Div. 1997), the property was co-owned by two parties, one of which resided in one of the apartments. The second apartment was rented to a tenant. Ibid. We did not extend Stewart liability because one owner resided on the premises. Id. at 99-100.

Therefore, a property will not be considered commercial if it is predominantly owner-occupied. Avallone, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 438. In making such a determination, a court must balance the nature of ownership as well as the ability to pass along the cost of liability. Ibid. It is not the use to which the property is put that is determinative, but rather the nature of the ownership. Hambright, supra, 200 N.J. Super. at 395.

In balancing the relevant factors, the key issue in determining whether a property is commercial is its “capacity to generate income.” Abraham, supra, 281 N.J. Super. at 85. Pursuant to Dupree v City of Clifton, 351 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d 175 N.J. 449 (2003), when considering the rule governing non-profits, we looked at the use of the property. Here, under the Dupree analysis applicable to non-profits, the use is strictly residential and thus, the law governing residential property applies. Brown was distinguished on the basis that the church in that case operated a private school on its premises.

Here, the Skyline Condominium Association (Skyline) is a non-profit corporation and its members are the present unit owners within the Skyline complex. Only owners are permitted to be members. The owners are permitted to lease their individual units, subject to the covenants and restrictions contained in the deed and by-laws. Although fees are collected from the members, the funds collected are used solely for the upkeep of the property, with no profit realized. This is different from a rental apartment building, which is considered commercial due to the owner’s capacity to generate income from the property. Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 160 n.7. Further, those persons who hold trustee positions within Skyline do not earn an income for their participation and thus there is no benefit derived. See Abraham, supra, 281 N.J. Super. at 85.

Balancing all relevant factors leads to the conclusion that Skyline is not subject to sidewalk liability pursuant to Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 149.

However, a landowner who has no duty to clear a sidewalk of snow and ice but who voluntarily undertakes the task of doing so will be liable if “through his negligence a new element of danger or hazard, other than one caused by natural forces, is added to the safe use of the sidewalk by a pedestrian.” Saco v. Hall, 1 N.J. 377, 381 (1949); see also Gentile v. National Newark & Essex Bkg. Co., 53 N.J. Super. 35, 39 (App. Div. 1958) (stating that “[t]he property owner is only liable if, in clearing the sidewalk, he increases the natural hazard by introducing some new element of danger”).

Plaintiff has to make a showing that defendants introduced a new hazard or danger on the sidewalk in their snow removal activities. See Foley v. Ulrich, 94 N.J. Super. 410, 420 (App. Div.) (Kolovsky, J., dissenting), rev’d on dissent, 50 N.J. 426 (1967)(landowners who shoveled snow from sidewalk were not liable to a pedestrian who fell on ice created after snow had melted, collected in a depression in the sidewalk, and then froze).

NOTE: My Law Office is located at 726 West Saint Georges [W. St. Georges] Avenue (Route 27), Linden, Union County, NJ. Telephone: 908-486-2200; EM@IL

Responsibility for sidewalk accidents originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on July 12, 2010.

Congress has passed an extension of the closing deadline for the Homebuyer Tax Credit, the Homebuyer Assistance and Improvement Act (H.R. 5623). The extension applies only to transactions that have ratified contracts in place as of April 30, 2010, that have not yet closed. The legislation is designed to create a seamless extension; the new closing deadline for eligible transactions is now September 30, 2010. There will be no gap between June 30 and the date the President signs the bill into law.

The National Association of Realtors worked closely with Congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle to enact this important legislation. Extending the tax credit closing deadline will help provide additional stability to real estate markets across the nation.

Source: National Association of Realtors, Community and Political Affairs & Government Affairs

For more information regarding this topic, please see the Realtor Action Center website at: www.RealtorActionCenter.com

NOTE: My Law Office is located at 726 West Saint Georges [W. St. Georges] Avenue (Route 27), Linden, Union County, NJ. Telephone: 908-486-2200; EM@IL

Homebuyer Tax Credit Closing Deadline Extended originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on July 1, 2010.

In the absence of contrary evidence, the valuation date for the sale of the former marital home should be the date of sale, not the date of the JOD. Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 269 (2007).

See related Blog Post, published in the New Jersey Family Law blog.

NOTE: My legal and mediation services are offered to Polish-speaking and other clients in Union, Middlesex, Somerset, Essex, Hudson, Bergen, and Morris counties in NJ.

In the absence of contrary evidence, the valuation date for the sale of the former marital home should be the date of sale originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on June 3, 2010.