“Settlement agreements in matrimonial matters, being essentially consensual and voluntary in character, . . . [are] entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability in equity, provided they are fair and just.” Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)); see also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 153 (1980).

An agreement like a Property Settlement and Separation Agreement (PSSA) is favored by the “‘strong public policy favoring stability of arrangements’ in matrimonial matters.” Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 360 (1977)). Accordingly, it is “approached with a predisposition in favor” of its “validity and enforceability.” Massar v. Massar, 279 N.J. Super. 89, 93 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 455 (1995). However, a PSSA may only be validated to the extent that the agreement is consensual and voluntary, Konzelman, supra, 158 N.J. at 194, and comports with “equitable precepts.” Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 143 (2004).

Marital property settlements agreements can only be enforced if they are fair to both parties because “‘contract principles have little place in the law of domestic relations.’” Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 323 (1992) (quoting Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 148). Nevertheless, matrimonial agreements such as the PSSA have long been recognized to be contractual in nature. Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265 (2007) (citing Massar, supra, 279 N.J. Super. at 93. “A basic principle of contract interpretation is to read the document as a whole in a fair and common sense manner.” Hardy ex. rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009). Moreover, “the law grants particular leniency to agreements made in the domestic arena,” which consequently gives “judges greater discretion when interpreting such agreements.” Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 542 (App. Div. 1992).

Additionally, “[a]s a general rule, courts should enforce contracts as the parties intended.” Pacifico, supra, 190 N.J. at 266. See also Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957) (noting that the court’s role in interpreting a contract is to enforce the parties’ common intent). Moreover, the court is required to “consider what is written in the context of the circumstances at the time of drafting and to apply a rational meaning in keeping with the ‘expressed general purpose.’” Pacifico, supra, 190 N.J. at 266 (quoting N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302 (1953)).

“The polestar of contract construction is to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used by them.” Karl’s Sales & Serv., Inc., v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 249 N.J. Super. 487, 492 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991). As such, the court should not re-write a contract or grant a better deal than that for which the parties expressly bargained. Solondz v. Kornmehl, 317 N.J. Super. 16, 21 (App. Div. 1998).

See related Blog Post, published in the New Jersey Family Law blog.

NOTE: This Blog/Blawg, NJ Family Issues, is managed by Paul G. Kostro, Esq., an attorney/lawyer/mediator in Linden, Union County, New Jersey.

Law Lessons from Jovic v. Jovic, App. Div. (DOCKET NO. A-2565-07T3; Decided April 28, 2009):

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A separation agreement can not be legally recognized under Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 83 N.J. 198 (1980) if the parties had not physically separated and continued to reside in the same house.

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