A “surrender” of parental rights is defined to mean “a voluntary relinquishment of all parental rights . . . for the purposes of allowing a child to be adopted.” N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. D.M.B., 375 N.J. Super. 141, 146 (App. Div.) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:3-38(j)), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 586 (2005). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-23, the Division of Youth and Family Services (the Division) is permitted to accept voluntary surrenders from parents in cases where it would be to the permanent advantage of the child to do so. D.M.B., supra, 375 N.J. Super. at 146. “In practice, an `identified surrender’ means that those exact person(s) as to whom the surrender is made shall adopt the children.” Id. at 145. Further, “[i]f for some reason the `identified’ persons are not able to adopt the child, the surrender becomes `void’ and the parental rights of surrendering parent(s) are reinstated.” Ibid.

NOTE: My legal and mediation services are offered to clients in Union, Middlesex, Somerset, Essex, Hudson, Bergen, and Morris counties in NJ.

A surrender of parental rights is defined to mean a voluntary relinquishment of all parental rights for the purposes of allowing a child to be adopted originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on November 15, 2011.

The grandparent visitation statute provides:

a. A grandparent . . . of a child residing in this State may make application before the Superior Court . . . for an order for visitation. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child.
b. In making a determination on an application filed pursuant to this section, the court shall consider the following factors:
(1) The relationship between the child and the applicant;
(2) The relationship between each of the child’s parents or the person with whom the child is residing and the applicant;
(3) The time which has elapsed since the child last had contact with the applicant;
(4) The effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the child and the child’s parents or the person with whom the child is residing;
(5) If the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing arrangement which exists between the parents with regard to the child;
(6) The good faith of the applicant in filing the application;
(7) Any history of physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect by the applicant; and
(8) Any other factor relevant to the best interests of the child.
c. With regard to any application made pursuant to this section, it shall be prima facie evidence that visitation is in the child’s best interest if the applicant had, in the past, been a full-time caretaker for the child.

[N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1.]

Our adoption statute provides, in pertinent part: “The entry of a judgment of adoption shall . . . terminate all parental rights and responsibilities of the parent towards the adoptive child except for a parent who is the spouse of the petitioner and except those rights that have vested prior to entry of the judgment of adoption[.]” N.J.S.A. 9:3-50(c)(1).

In Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 429 (1975), the Court considered whether the maternal grandmother of a child whose mother had died was “entitled to visit [the child] by virtue of N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 when the natural father and his second wife, who . . . legally adopted the child, refuse to permit visitation[.]” The particular adoption statute that the Court considered vis-à-vis the grandmother’s request provided that “[t]he entry of a judgment of adoption shall terminate all relationships between the child and his parents, and shall terminate all rights, duties and obligations of any person which are founded upon such relationships[.]” N.J.S.A. 9:3-30(A).

Although the Legislature at one time declined to enact a provision that would have permitted “‘visitation or other type of communication with the child after the adoption by any person who . . . was biologically related to the adopted child[,]‘” W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 172, no provision of the current Adoption Act expressly prohibits such visitation or communication.

In Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 (2003), the Court cited studies confirming “the importance of the grandparent/grandchild relationship in the lives of children” because the “love, nurturance, and acceptance which grandchildren have found in the grandparent/grandchild relationship ‘confers a natural form of social immunity on children that they cannot get from any other person or institution.’” Id. at 97 (quoting Arthur Kornhaber M.D. & Kenneth L. Woodward, Grandparents/Grandchildren: The Vital Connection xiii-xiv (1981)). In consideration of these findings, the Court declined to prohibit grandparent visitation outright even where “fundamental right[s]” of “family and parental autonomy,” id. at 103, were implicated.

In deference to those “fundamental right[s]” the Court held that the grandparent visitation statute “is subject to strict scrutiny and will only pass muster if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Ibid. (citations omitted). To achieve that purpose and strike the appropriate balance between the rights of parents (whether natural or adoptive) and the rights of grandparents, the Court reiterated the standard it adopted three years earlier in Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235. (2000):

“Since the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is both a natural and legal right, the law should not disturb the parent/child relationship except for the strongest reasons and only upon a clear showing of a parent’s gross misconduct or unfitness or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.”

[Moriarty, supra, 177 N.J. at 112 (quoting Watkins, supra, 163 N.J. at 245).]

The Court in Moriarty concluded that “avoiding harm to the child is the polestar and the constitutional imperative that is necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of the parent’s decision and to justify intrusion into family life.” Id. at 113. The Court “approve[d]” imposing “the preponderance of the evidence burden” upon grandparents invoking the visitation statute, and held that such burden will “fully protect[] the fundamental rights of parents when coupled with the harm standard.” Id. at 117.

In this case, the children were adopted in New York. In that context, New York’s adoption statute provides that upon a child’s adoption, “the birth parents . . . shall have no rights over [the] child” and the “adoptive parents . . . and the adoptive child shall sustain toward each other the legal relation of parent and child . . . .” N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 117(1)(a), (c) (Consol. 2011).

New York courts have permitted “‘open adoption[s]‘, . . . in which contact, including visitation, is permitted between the adopted child and members of his birth family” where such contact “may serve to promote the best interests of the child.” In re Adoption of Anthony, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (Fam. Ct. 1982).

Section 72 of New York’s Domestic Relations Law specifically grants a grandparent the right to seek visitation either where the parents are deceased or “where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene.” N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law, § 72(1) (Consol. 2011). In People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 322 (1982), the New York Court of Appeals “uph[eld] the right of a natural grandparent to visitation rights with her grandchild, when authorized by court decree, despite an adoption of the child and the protestations of the adoptive parents” where such visitation was “in the best interest of [the] adopted child.” The Court rejected the adoptive parents’ argument that section 117 of the Domestic Relations Law “severs all of the child’s ties to its natural family,” finding that such an analysis of the statutory language was “overbroad[] and would interfere with the court’s ability to protect the best interest of the child.” Id. at 324. In fact, it is now well-established in New York that “[a] grandparent may seek visitation with a grandchild even after parental rights have been terminated or the child has been freed for adoption.” In re Ann M.C. v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 682 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (App. Div. 1998).

In th this case, considering that the children were adopted according to the laws of New York, the judge must address which adoption law applies. This choice will not affect the analysis, however, as the court has determined that New Jersey’s adoption statute does not preclude a request for grandparent visitation.

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New Jersey’s adoption statute does not preclude a request for grandparent visitation originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on June 29, 2011.

Once a minor had been adopted, a more rigorous standard controls the natural grandparent’s request to visit the minor. The child’s granparent now shoulders the burden of showing that visitation between her and the child is necessary to avoid harm to the child. In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545, 573 (2010); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 88 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1408, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).

Our Supreme Court has recognized the uniqueness of the relationship between grandparents and their grandchildren:

It is biological fact that grandparents are bound to their grandchildren by the unbreakable links of heredity. It is common human experience that the concern and interest grandparents take in the welfare of their grandchildren far exceeds anything explicable in purely biological terms. A very special relationship often arises and continues between grandparents and grandchildren. The tensions and conflicts which commonly mar relations between parents and children are often absent between those very same parents and their grandchildren. Visits with a grandparent are often a precious part of a child’s experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild from the relationship with his grandparents which he cannot derive from any other relationship. Neither the Legislature nor this Court is blind to human truths which grandparents and grandchildren have always known.

[Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 437 (1975).]

In spite of the unique relationship between grandparents and their grandchildren, the Court has recognized that a grandparent seeking visitation over the objection of the biological or adoptive parent bears an extremely heavy burden. D.C., supra, 203 N.J. at 573.

“At common law, third parties had no right to petition for visitation with children.” Id. at 564. Further, “[a]t common law, a grandparent’s right to visitation could rise no higher than that of the natural parent[,]” but “‘[w]here grandparents have a direct, personal relationship with the grandchild, their rights are found independent of the parents’ rights.’” N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.D., 233 N.J. Super. 401, 416 (App. Div. 1989) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Torres, 185 N.J. Super. 234, 246-47 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1980), aff’d, 185 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 1982)) (alteration in original). It is now recognized that the termination of the parental rights of a child’s biological parents does not “in itself, [] magically alter[] the child’s day-to-day life or . . . justify cutting off pre-existing sibling [or grandparent] contact.” D.C., supra, 203 N.J. at 564.

However, the Court has recognized that there is a conflict between the Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute, which made it possible for grandparents and siblings to be granted visitation over the objection of the biological parents and the Adoption Act, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50, which emphasizes the complete termination of the biological parents’ rights, thus having the logical effect of terminating a biological grandparents’ right to visitation. The Court has noted that the Legislature has not intended to harmonize the conflict, observing:

Based on an examination of the legislative history of the Grandparent Visitation Statute and the Adoption Act, we find that the Legislature did not intend to harmonize or conform the two statutes. The two statutes are separate. Moreover, we believe that the statute that permits visitation rights of parents of the biological parents of a child adopted by intact nonrelative adoptive parents is in conflict with the provisions of the Adoption Act. An examination of the statutory scheme of the Adoption Act further supports that conclusion.

[In re W.P., 163 N.J. 158, 168 (2000).]

More fundamentally, the United States Supreme Court struck down a statute enacted by the State of Washington which granted “breathtakingly broad” grandparent visitation, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 57 (2000), prompting our Supreme Court to reassess our own Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute. Moriarty, supra, 177 N.J. at 88. In that reassessment, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he right to rear one’s child is so deeply embedded in our history and culture that it has been identified as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 101 (citations omitted). Thus, “when [a] State seeks, by statute, to interfere with family and parental autonomy, a fundamental right is at issue. [Hence,] [t]hat statute . . . is subject to strict scrutiny and will only pass muster if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. at 103. The Court concluded that “[b]ecause the Grandparent Visitation Statute is an incursion on a fundamental right (the right to parental autonomy), . . . it is subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.” Id. at 114.

Our Supreme Court had recognized, however, that “the right to parental autonomy is not absolute, and a biological family may be ordered to permit third-party visitation, over its objections, where necessary under the exercise of our parens patriae jurisdiction to avoid harm to the child.” D.C., supra, 203 N.J. at 551-52. The Court has stated that

the application of the best interests standard to a third party’s petition for visitation is an affront to the family’s right to privacy and autonomy and that interference with a biological or adoptive family’s decision-making can only be justified on the basis of the exercise of our parens patriae jurisdiction to avoid harm to the child.

[Id. at 573.]

See also Moriarty, supra, 177 N.J. 84 at 114-15 (noting the only State interest warranting the invocation of the State’s parens patriae jurisdiction to overcome the presumption in favor of a parent’s decision and to force grandparent visitation over the wishes of a fit parent is the avoidance of harm to the child).

Thus, a higher burden must be met for a grandparent to enforce an asserted right of visitation after the grandchild has been adopted by an unrelated third party. The focus is not on the grandparents’ desires but rather on the need to avoid harm to the child. Under such circumstances, the biological grandparent must demonstrate that visitation over the objection of the adoptive parent is necessary to avoid harm to the child. D.C., supra, 203 N.J. at 551. “[T]he Grandparent Visitation Statute was not intended to be applied in the case of adoption by nonrelatives, and must not be applied because court-enforced visitation by biological grandparents would discourage — if not prevent — adoption.” W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 173-74.

In its discussion in D.C., the Supreme Court explained:

Critical to our reasoning in W.P. was our desire not to relegate the adoptive parents to second-class status. In other words, because we recognized that a biological family could not be forced to permit a third-party access to its child based on a best interests analysis, we afforded adoptive families the same protection.

[D.C., supra, 203 N.J. at 570.]

In considering the issue of sibling visitation, the D.C. Court held that, pursuant to the Visitation Statute, a relative’s application for post-adoption visitation is to be evaluated in an evidentiary hearing at which the applicant, to be successful, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the affected sibling. Id. at 562-66, 573-74. The D.C. Court again recognized that because the “best-interests standard is an unwarranted incursion on the fundamental right of the parents to raise their children as they see fit[,]” in order to maintain the statute’s constitutionality, the applicant for post-adoption visitation is required to meet the “exceptional circumstances” standard, which “‘requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm.’” Id. at 571-72 (quoting Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 248 (2000)).

The same family and parental autonomy is afforded to the biological family and to the adoptive family. As the Court noted: “[T]he right to parental autonomy is not absolute, and a biological family may be ordered to permit third-party visitation, over its objections, where it is necessary under the exercise of our parens patriae jurisdiction to avoid harm to the child. That principle governs adoptive families as well.” Id. at 551-52.

At another point the Court explained:

In other words, because adoptive families stand in the shoes of biological families, the Division correctly argues that they have the same right to family privacy and autonomy as the latter. However, an adoptive family is not entitled to greater protections than a biological family. Thus, to the extent that visitation by a third party may be compelled over the objections of a biological family, the same rule applies to an adoptive family.

[Id. at 570.]

Moriarty, supra, provides guidance here for assessing the adequacy of evidence of potential harm. 177 N.J. at 115-18. The “evidence can be expert or factual.” Id. at 117. “[T]he termination of a long-standing relationship between the grandparents and the child, with expert testimony assessing the effect of those circumstances, [can] form the basis for a finding of harm.” Ibid.; Daniels v. Daniels, 381 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2005) (“harm of the type recognized in Moriarty generally rests on the existence of an unusually close relationship between the grandparent and the child”). If the applicant does not plead or present proof of harm to the child, “the complaint is properly dismissed” for failure to establish the threshold harm. Daniels, supra, 381 N.J. Super. at 294; Mizrahi v. Cannon, 375 N.J. Super. 221, 234 (App. Div. 2005).

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To the extent that visitation by a third party may be compelled over the objections of a biological family, the same rule applies to an adoptive family originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on May 24, 2011.

Under the previous incarnation of New Jersey’s Adoption law, N.J.S.A. §9:3-30(A), “The entry of a judgment of adoption shall terminate all relationships between the child and his parents, and shall terminate all rights, duties, and obligations of any person which are founded upon such relationships, including rights of inheritance under the intestate laws of this state; provided however that when the adopting parent is a stepfather or stepmother, and the adoption is consummated with the consent and approval of the mother or father, respectively, such adoption shall not affect or terminate any relationships between the child and such mother or father.” That statutory provision became effective January 1, 1954, and was later amended to include the provision, “. . . nor the rights of inheritance under the intestate laws of this State.”, effective July 21, 1966. The change to the law was applied prospectively. See In re Wolf, 93 N.J.Super. 83, 88 (Ch. Div. 1966). In 1977, N.J.S.A. §9:3-30 was repealed, and replaced with the current law, which reads in part, “The entry of a judgment of adoption shall: . . . (3) terminate all rights of inheritance under intestacy from or through the child which existed prior to the adoption.” N.J.S.A. § 9:3-50(c)(3).

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The entry of a judgment of adoption terminates all rights of inheritance under intestacy from or through the child which existed prior to the adoption originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on April 13, 2011.

N.J.S.A. §9:3-50(c)(3) is interpreted to mean that child support arrears owed prior to an adoption are vested rights of the children, and such arrearage is not severed by an adoption judgment – only the duty to support going forward is affected by a judgment. C. v. R., 169 N.J. Super. 168, 172 (Ch. Div. 1979).

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Child support arrears owed prior to an adoption are vested rights of the children originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on April 13, 2011.

Where an adoption statute could possibly be construed as conflicting with a testator’s probable intent, the statute must be interpreted in a way that does not thwart the testator’s intent. “Generally, the word “descendants” in a will ‘signifies children, grandchildren and other issue to the remotest degree.’; Redmond v. N.J. Historical Soc., 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 470-471 (E. & A. 1942) (citing Thompson on Wills (2d ed.) 358, 359 § 279). ‘While children are descendants, descendants are not always children.” For the word “descendants is a broader term than children and includes all lineal heirs in the direct descending line from the person or all who proceed from his body.’ It is ‘practically synonymous with issue in its legal meaning.’” Id.

N.J.S.A. §3B:3-33 codifies the doctrine of probable intent, and reads, “(a) the intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions. . .”. New Jersey’s Supreme Court long ago ruled, “In ascertaining the subjective intent of the testator, courts will give primary emphasis to his dominant plan and purpose as they appear from the entirety of his will when read and considered in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Fidelity Union Trust co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561 (1962). The Court also wrote, “so far as the situation fairly permits, courts will ascribe to the testator ‘those impulses which are common to human nature and will construe the will so as to effectuate those impulses. Id. at 565.

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Adoption and a testator’s probable intent originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on April 13, 2011.

Adult adoptees are treated differently than people adopted as children with regard to inheritance of class gifts from and through the adoptive parents. New Jersey employs the “Stranger to the Adoption” Doctrine, which essentially holds an adult adoptee may not share in the estate of a third party who was not a party to the adoption proceeding.

In In re Nicol, 152 N.J. Super. 308, 320 (App. Div. 1977) the court held that, “While a stranger to the adoption, motivated by high-minded principles, would be quick to accept and welcome the relationship between an adopting parent and an adopted child, we cannot say that this would be true in the case of an adopted adult.”. This concept is codified in N.J.S.A. §2A:22-3(c)(a): “The person adopted shall not be capable of taking property expressly limited by a will or any other instrument to the heirs of the body of the adopting parent or parents, nor property coming on intestacy from the collateral kindred of the adopting parent or parents by right of representation . . .” In Nicol, the Appellate Division held the adopted adult children of the testator’s son could not share in the testator’s estate. Id. at 310-311. The testator in that case left the remainder of a trust to “issue (or lineal descendants) of myself then living.” Id. at 311. Applying the stranger to the adoption doctrine, the Court found an adult adoptee is not properly within the meaning of issue as intended by the testator. In fact, the Court recognizes a presumption that an adult adoptee is not to be included in class gifts to issue, lineal descendants or the like. In re Vander Poel, 396 N.J. Super. 218 (App. Div. 2007)(citing Commercial Trust Co. of N.J. v. Adelung, 136 N.J. Eq. 37 9Ch. Div 1944).

Similarly, the Chancery Division rejected the attempt by a woman adopted by Doris Duke at the age of 35 to take under the terms of a trust benefiting Ms. Duke’s “lineal descendants” following her death. In re Duke, 305 N.J. Super. 408, 417 (Ch. Div. 1995). In that case, the court applied the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine and found the adult adoptee in that case could not be considered a lineal descendant of Ms. Duke, and so was not eligible to take under the trust.

Importantly, the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine creates a presumption, which may be overcome by language in the governing instrument. In re Fenton, 386 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2006). In that case, express language defined adopted children as included in the beneficiary class.

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The stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on April 13, 2011.

In In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545 (2010), the Court held that pursuant to the Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute (Visitation Statute), N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, post-adoption sibling visitation is to be evaluated in an evidentiary hearing at which the applicant, to be successful, must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that such visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the affected sibling. Id. at 562-66, 573-74.

In D.C., supra, the Court addressed the standards applicable to sibling requests for visitation both pre- and post-adoption. 203 N.J. at 551. During the entire pre-adoption placement period, the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6B-1 to -6 (Child Placement Act), obligates the Division “to nurture sibling bonds . . . whether or not a sibling has initiated the process and whether or not termination [of parental rights] has occurred.” Id. at 564. Under the Child Placement Act, “the Division is obliged, on its own and even in the absence of an application by a sibling, to insure and facilitate such visitation under N.J.S.A. 9:6B-4(f), up until the time that an adoption is finalized.” Id. at 565. Accordingly, during the pre-adoption placement period, the burden lay on the Division “to show that visitation would be inconsistent `with the health, safety, and physical and psychological welfare of the child’ and is inappropriate `to the individual circumstances of the child’s physical or mental development.’” Id. at 565-66 (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6B-4).

The post-adoption circumstance, however, presents special countervailing considerations, which the Court in D.C., supra, acknowledged:

Our law recognizes the family as a bastion of autonomous privacy in which parents, presumed to act in the best interests of their children, are afforded self-determination over how those children are raised. All of the attributes of a biological family are applicable in the case of adoption; adoptive parents are free, within the same limits as biological parents, to raise their children as they see fit, including choices regarding religion, education, and association. However, the right to parental autonomy is not absolute, and a biological family may be ordered to permit third-party visitation, over its objections where it is necessary under the exercise of our parens patriae jurisdiction to avoid harm to the child. That principle governs adoptive families as well.

[Id. at 551-52.] ^[1]

Of course, the Legislature had earlier recognized this principle in its enactment of the Visitation Statute, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, the purpose of which is to foster “intergenerational family relationships” and “sibling bonds.” See id. at 559-61. Specifically, the Visitation Statute, provides, in relevant part:

A grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in this State may make application before the Superior Court, in accordance with the Rules of Court, for an order for visitation. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child.

[N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1a.] However, because the “best-interests standard is an unwarranted incursion on the fundamental right of the parents to raise their children as they see fit[,]” the D.C. Court, in order to maintain the statute’s constitutionality, has required the applicant to meet the “exceptional circumstances” standard, which “`requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm.’” D.C., supra, 203 N.J. at 571-72 (quoting Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 248 (2000)). Thus, pursuant to the Visitation Statute, “siblings can petition for visitation with their brothers and sisters who have been adopted by non-relatives, subject to the avoidance of harm standard.” Id. at 573.

In this regard, the D.C. Court required a standard of proof — preponderance of the evidence — lesser than the one we applied in the instant matter:

[T]he analysis is a fact-intensive one in which the sibling “bear[s] the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the child.” Moriarty[ v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117 (2003)]. Any evidence, expert or factual, that bears on the question of harm to the child should be admitted. It is for the trial judge to determine whether the burden has been satisfied.

[Id. at 574.] Once the applicant has demonstrated the potential harm to the child by a preponderance of the evidence, the presumption in favor of parental decision making is overcome and a court will exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction to require a visitation schedule it deems is in the child’s best interests “based on the application of the statutory factors” in N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1. Id. at 574. It is, of course, “for the trial judge to determine whether the burden has been satisfied.” Ibid.

NOTE: Adwokat / Prawnik Pawel Kostro mowi po polsku.

1. The New Jersey Adoption Act, N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 to -56 (Adoption Act), provides that “[t]he entry of a judgment of adoption shall establish the same relationships, rights, and responsibilities between the child and the adopting parent as if the child were born to the adopting parent in lawful wedlock.” N.J.S.A. 9:3-50b. Thus, “adoptive families stand in the shoes of biological families . . . . However, an adoptive family is not entitled to greater protections than a biological family.” D.C., supra, 203 N.J. at 570.

Post-adoption sibling visitation is to be evaluated in an evidentiary hearing at which the applicant, to be successful, must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that such visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the affected sibling originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on February 17, 2011.

Under the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6B-1 to -6, visitation between siblings placed outside the home is presumed in the period before adoption, and the Division has an independent obligation to facilitate visitation.

To oppose visitation, the Division must prove it is contrary to the child’s welfare under the standards provided in the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act.

After adoption, adoptive parents are free, within the same limits as biological parents, to raise their child as they see fit. Parental autonomy is not absolute, however. A biological or adoptive family may be ordered to permit third-party visitation where necessary to avoid harm to the child.

See related blog post, published by Sandra C. Fava, Esq.: NJ SUPREME COURT REVIEWS STANDARD FOR SIBLING VISITATION AFTER ADOPTION AND/OR PLACEMENT.

NOTE: My legal services include family law, divorce, child support, litigation, arbitration, mediation, child custody and visitation, alimony, equitable distribution, separation agreements, palimony, PSA, property settlement agreement, premarital and prenuptial agreements, midmarriage and marital agreements.

A biological or adoptive family may be ordered to permit third-party visitation where necessary to avoid harm to the child originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on September 29, 2010.

NOTE:
My Law Office is located at 726 West Saint Georges [W. St. Georges] Avenue (Route 27), Linden, Union County, NJ. Telephone: 908-486-2200; EM@IL

Instead of happiness, adoptions can lead to lawsuits originally appeared on NJ Family Issues on April 27, 2010.