J.S. V. J.F., 410 N.J. Super. 611 (App. Div. 2009), A-2552-08T2, December 10, 2009:

The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, permits the entry of restraining orders in favor of victims of domestic violence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29. The Act defines a “victim of domestic violence” as including, among others, “any person who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship.” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19d. It does not, however, define what is meant by “a dating relationship.” Instead, the Legislature has left it to the courts, in their day-to-day involvement with these matters, to determine what relationships might be properly characterized as dating relationships.

Our decisional law defining the scope of a dating relationship is essentially limited to a single opinion authored by a trial judge. In Andrews v. Rutherford, 363 N.J. Super. 252, 260 (Ch. Div. 2003), Judge Michael Hogan suggested various factors to be evaluated in defining what constitutes a dating relationship for purposes of the Act:

1. Was there a minimal social interpersonal bonding of the parties over and above a mere casual fraternization?
2. How long did the alleged dating activities continue prior to the acts of domestic violence alleged?
3. What were the nature and frequency of the parties’ interactions?
4. What were the parties’ ongoing expectations with respect to the relationship, either individually or jointly?
5. Did the parties demonstrate an affirmation of their relationship before others by statement or conduct?
6. Are there any other reasons unique to the case that support or detract from a finding that a “dating relationship” exists?

Recognizing the difficulties in attempting to describe all the characteristics of a dating relationship, Judge Hogan concluded that “[w]hile none of these factors may be individually dispositive on the issue, one or more of the factors may be more or less relevant in any given case depending on the evidence presented.” Ibid.

The facts should be liberally construed in favor of finding a dating relationship, ibid., because the Act itself is to be liberally construed in favor of the legislative intent to eradicate domestic violence. ^[1] Stated another way, the Act embodies a strong public policy against domestic violence. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 400 (1998). Because the Act is remedial in nature, it has been liberally construed for the protection of victims of domestic violence. Ibid.; Tribuzio, supra, 356 N.J. Super. at 596. Indeed, the Act itself announces that its purpose is “to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. These principles would not be served by a cramped interpretation of what constitutes a dating relationship.

Considering the Act’s intended broad scope, we reject the contention that a relationship which includes a payment of consideration for the other’s time precludes the finding of a dating relationship. Indeed, an au pair or live-in housekeeper would undoubtedly qualify as a “person who is a present or former household member,” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19d, entitled to relief under the Act, even though that person might be a member of the household only because compensation has been paid for his or her presence. The fact that a person receives a monetary benefit from engaging in a relationship does not automatically disqualify that person from the Act’s benefits.

Experience suggests that most claims of a dating relationship turn on what the particular parties would view as a “date.” “Dating” is a loose concept undoubtedly defined differently by members of different socio-economic groups and from one generation to the next. Accordingly, although Andrews suggests some useful factors, courts should vigilantly guard against a slavish adherence to any formula that does not consider the parties’ own understanding of their relationship as colored by socio-economic and generational influences.

See my prior post: What is a dating relationship?; see also: The Domestic Violence Act does not seek to protect only those who are involved in a sexual relationship and exclude those who are involved in fraternization

See related Blog Post, published in the Law Office of Donald D. Vanarelli Blog.


See related Blog Post, published by John S. Eory, Esq. in the New Jersey Law Blog

NOTE: My Law Office is located at 726 West Saint Georges [W. St. Georges] Avenue (Route 27), Linden, Union County, NJ. Telephone: 908-486-2200

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1. Other than Andrews, those cases that have dealt with dating relationships have focused on the problem created when the alleged act of domestic violence occurred years after termination of the dating relationship. See Tribuzio v. Roder, 356 N.J. Super. 590, 594-98 (App. Div. 2003); Sperling v. Teplitsky, 294 N.J. Super. 312, 318-21 (Ch. Div. 1996). See also M.A. v. E.A., 388 N.J. Super. 612, 618 (App. Div. 2006) (rejecting the contention that a person’s sexual assaults of his stepdaughter over a course of time gave rise to a dating relationship within the meaning of the Act). [↩]