Law Lessons from BARBARA SAVINI VS. PETER TRIESTMAN, App. Div. (A-5095-07T1; Decided July 10, 2009): [See subsequent history HERE]

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Whether a support “obligation should be modified based upon a claim of changed circumstances rests within a Family Part judge’s sound discretion.” Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990); Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 470 (App. Div. 2004); Steneken v. Steneken, 367 N.J. Super. 427, 434 (App. Div. 2004), aff’d as modified, 183 N.J. 290 (2005). Accordingly, a motion to modify support obligations “rests upon its own particular footing.

Additionally, maintaining the stability of marital agreements is favored. See Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J. Super. 357, 379 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 (2004) (public policy favors stability of consensual arrangements for support in matrimonial matters); Avery v. Avery, 209 N.J. Super. 155, 160 (App. Div. 1986) (same). Thus, defendant has a heavy burden when seeking to alter the parties’ specific agreement and reduce the amount of support less than two years from the entry of the FJOD. Ibrahim v. Aziz, 402 N.J. Super. 205, 213 (App. Div. 2008); Gordon v. Rozenwald, 380 N.J. Super. 55, 67 (App. Div. 2005).

Any “[d]determin[ation] [of] the impact and magnitude of ‘changed circumstances’ necessarily entails knowing the starting point before the change, that is, the point from which the change can be measured.” Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 316 (App. Div. 2001). “[W]ithout accurately knowing the true point of beginning,” New Jersey courts consider unreliable, by definition, a Lepis determination of changed circumstances. Id. at 316-17. Even still, a court may not “presuppose an arbitrary or false starting point.” Id. at 317.

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