Crespo v. Crespo, 408 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div. 2009), appeal granted, 200 N.J. 468 (2009) (Fisher, J.A.D.) (A-0203-08T2; June 18, 2009):

[NOTE: Certification was granted on October 8, 2009 -- We will see what the N.J. Supreme Court has to say. 1/4/2010: See related Blog Post, published in the New Jersey Family Law blog.]

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Domestic violence actions, by their very nature, naturally pit the first and third Mathews [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976)] factors, that is, victims’ interests in being protected from domestic violence against defendants’ liberty interests in being free to say what they wish and go where they please. The Legislature obviously viewed the victims’ interests as highly important and of far greater weight than defendants’ interests, when it declared in the Act that domestic violence is a serious crime against society; that there are thousands of persons in this State who are regularly beaten, tortured and in some cases even killed by their spouses or cohabitants; that a significant number of women who are assaulted are pregnant; that victims of domestic violence come from all social and economic backgrounds and ethnic groups; that there is a positive correlation between spousal abuse and child abuse; and that children, even when they are not themselves physically assaulted, suffer deep and lasting emotional effects from exposure to domestic violence. It is therefore, the intent of the Legislature to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18 .]

The Supreme Court has also recognized the important societal interest in protecting victims of domestic violence:
Domestic violence is a serious problem in our society. Each year, three to four million women from all socio-economic classes, races, and religions, are battered by husbands, partners, and boyfriends. The Act and its legislative history confirm that New Jersey has a strong policy against domestic violence. Although New Jersey is in the forefront of states that have sought to curb domestic violence, New Jersey police reported 77,680 incidents of domestic violence in 2000 alone.
[State v. Reyes, 172 N.J. 154, 163 (2002).]

In light of these unmistakable expressions of public policy, the court recognized that the strong societal interest in protecting persons victimized by domestic violence greatly favors utilization of the preponderance standard.

Clear and convincing evidence is that which is “so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue.” Matter of Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74 (1993) (quoting In re Boardwalk Regency Casino License Application, 180 N.J. Super. 324, 339 (App. Div. 1981), modified, 90 N.J. 361 (1982)). The clear-and-convincing standard thereby requires that the judge possess “a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Matter of Purrazzella, 134 N.J. 228, 240 (1993) (quoting Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super. 156, 162 (App. Div. 1960)). Judges — being human — may at times err in assessing which of two contestants has told the truth; we do not, however, view Mathews as requiring a burden of persuasion that more effectively eliminates the chance of a mistaken adjudication at the steep price of permitting countless more meritorious claims to be lost at the hands of the clear-and-convincing standard.

Because the interests at stake and the factfinding required of our Family Part judges in domestic violence matters is not at all similar to those matters in which courts have compelled application of the clear-and-convincing standard, the court concluded — in conformity with the holding in Roe v. Roe, 253 N.J. Super. 418, 427 (App. Div. 1992) — that a standard more demanding than the preponderance standard “would undermine the social purposes of the Act.” 253 N.J. Super. at 428.

Consequently, the court rejected the argument that the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, is unconstitutional because it imposes only a preponderance standard.