Law Lessons from T.H. v. Pattison, App. Div. (A-0703-08T3; Decided April 9, 2009):

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Harassment, one of the predicate offenses on which a finding of domestic violence may be based, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13), is defined as follows:
A person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he:
a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or
c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.]

As the necessary proof of a purpose to harass another, there is rarely direct proof of intent, and purpose may and often must be inferred from what is said and done and the surrounding circumstances. Prior conduct and statements may be relevant to and support an inference of purpose. State v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 606 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 577 (2006).

At its core, the Act effectuates the notion that the victim of domestic violence is entitled to be left alone. State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997).

Under the doctrine established in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), one sufficiently egregious action is sufficient and a pattern of abusive and controlling behavior, although a classic characteristic of domestic violence, is not necessary where the one predicate action of domestic violence is sufficiently egregious.

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