Law Lessons from Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2009) (Fisher, J.A.D.) (A-2389-07T3; Decided February 2, 2009):
As the court explained in Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 2006):
There is, of course, no brightline rule by which to measure when a changed circumstance has endured long enough to warrant a modification of a support obligation. Instead, such matters turn on the discretionary determinations of Family Part judges, based upon their experience as applied to all the relevant circumstances presented, which we do not disturb absent an abuse of discretion.
[384 N.J. Super. at 23.]
The court also observed in Larbig, “what constitutes a temporary change in income should be viewed more expansively when urged by a self-employed obligor,” who is “in a better position to present an unrealistic picture of his or her actual income than a W-2 earner.” 384 N.J. Super. at 23.
The trial court must consider — in both fixing and altering a support obligation — what is equitable and fair in all the circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 158 (1980); see also Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 360 (1977). This requires not only an examination of the parties’ earnings but also how they have expended their income and utilized their assets.
When seeking an adjustment to alimony, it is not enough that an obligor demonstrate a reduction in income; the obligor must also demonstrate how he or she has attempted to improve the diminishing circumstances. See, e.g., Aronson v. Aronson, 245 N.J. Super. 354, 361 (App. Div. 1991) (concluding that a movant had failed to present a prima facie case of changed circumstances when “what he did was to allow his practice to continue to diminish unchecked while bemoaning his fate”); Arribi v. Arribi, 186 N.J. Super. 116, 118 (Ch. Div. 1982) (finding that the “pervading philosophy” in our precedents is that “one cannot find himself in, and choose to remain in, a position where he has diminished or no earning capacity and expect to be relieved of or to be able to ignore the obligations of support to one’s family”).
On the other hand, an opponent of a Lepis motion is not required to provide a case information statement or disclose financial information until such time as the movant demonstrates a change in circumstances. Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 157. This showing may relate to changes in the movant’s financial circumstances, or the opponent’s, or a combination of both:
Lepis does not stand for the proposition that a prima facie showing of changed circumstances by an applicant must relate solely to his or her own finances. While it is probably fair to say that this is the way most cases are presented because litigants are more fully aware of their own finances than of those of the opposing party, under Lepis, a payor spouse is as much entitled to a reconsideration of alimony where there has been a significant change for the better in the circumstances of the dependent spouse as where there has been a significant change for the worse in the payor’s own circumstances. Likewise, a movant may make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances under Lepis by citing a combination of changes on the part of both parties which together have altered the status quo which existed at the time of the entry of the support order under review.
[Stamberg v. Stamberg, 302 N.J. Super. 35, 42 (App. Div. 1997).]
[See related Blog Post, published in the New Jersey Family Law blog.]
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