Law Lessons from Theiller v. Theiller, App. Div. (A-1665-06T3; Decided December 30, 2008):

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In determining an equitable distribution of marital assets, the court must engage in a three-step process. First, it must decide what property of each party is eligible for distribution. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232 (1974). Next, it must determine the value of each piece of property. Ibid. Last, the court must decide how an allocation between the two spouses can most equitably be made. Ibid. This three-step process has been incorporated by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1, which requires that “in every case, the court shall make specific findings of fact on the evidence relative to all issues pertaining to asset eligibility or ineligibility, asset valuation, and equitable distribution?. . . .” To that end, the trial judge “must receive, and must insist upon having, the full cooperation of the litigants.” Rothman, supra, 65 N.J. at 233. Moreover, in advance of trial, counsel for both parties must ensure that their clients “have carefully reviewed all eligible property interests they possess and that they come to court prepared to testify fully and accurately with respect thereto.” Ibid.

A trial judge has broad discretion in determining how to divide marital assets that have been identified by the parties to the action. Wadlow v. Wadlow, 200 N.J. Super. 372, 377 (App. Div. 1985). There is no presumption that marital assets should be distributed equally. Rothman, supra, 65 N.J. at 232 n.6. However, it is presumed that each party contributed to the marital enterprise. Perkins v. Perkins, 159 N.J. Super. 243, 247 (App. Div. 1978). Even if the acquisition of property may be traced more directly to one party than the other, the distribution must reflect both the non-pecuniary and the pecuniary contributions to the marriage. Ibid. This reflects “the concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a partnership.” Rothman, supra, 65 N.J. at 229.
Statutory equitable distribution is based on the philosophy that marriage is a joint enterprise in which the interest in and entitlement to its underlying property is also joint and mutual. The entitlement to marital property is not dependent on economic contributions as such. Less tangible efforts are recognized as equally valuable to the overall prosperity of the familial entity.
[Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 347 (1990).]

The basic purpose of alimony is “to assist the supported spouse in achieving a lifestyle that is reasonably comparable to the one enjoyed while living with the supporting spouse during the marriage.” Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16 (2000). “The supporting spouse’s obligation is set at a level that will maintain that standard.” Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 503 (1990) (citing Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980)). “Bare survival is not the proper standard, it is the quality of the economic life during the marriage that determines alimony.” Hughes v. Hughes, 311 N.J. Super. 15, 31 (App. Div. 1998).

Hence, the award of spousal support is broadly discretionary. Steneken v. Steneken, 367 N.J. Super. 427, 434 (App. Div. 2004), aff’d in part, 183 N.J. 290 (2005). However, such discretion is not limitless. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) sets forth “guidelines and objective standards which frame the exercise of the court’s discretion.” Ibid. Thus, in determining whether alimony is appropriate and, if so, in setting the type, amount and duration of an award, the court must consider the following statutory criteria, insofar as they are relevant:
(1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay;
(2) The duration of the marriage;
(3) The age, physical and emotional health of the parties;
(4) The standard of living established in the marriage and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living;
(5) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties;
(6) The length of absence from the job market of the party seeking maintenance;
(7) The parental responsibilities for the children;
(8) The time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, the availability of the training and employment, and the opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;
(9) The history of the financial or non-financial contributions to the marriage by each party including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities;
(10) The equitable distribution of property ordered and any payouts on equitable distribution, directly or indirectly, out of current income, to the extent this consideration is reasonable, just and fair;
(11) The income available to either party through investment of any assets held by that party;
(12) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a non-taxable payment; and
(13) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant.

Trial courts have a duty to make specific findings of fact and to state reasons on the record that support their conclusions. R. 1:7-4; Heinl v. Heinl, supra, 287 N.J. Super. at 347. “Naked conclusions are insufficient . . . [a] judge must fully and specifically articulate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Ibid. Where the imputation of income is concerned, this “is a discretionary matter not capable of precise or exact determination but rather requiring a trial judge to realistically appraise capacity to earn and job availability.” Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 474 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Tash v. Tash, 353 N.J. Super. 94, 99 (App. Div. 2002)).