COLEMAN v. ROMANO, 388 N.J.Super. 342 (Chan. Div. 2006):

This case requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff and her adult daughter are “former household members” under the statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), notwithstanding that they have not lived in the same house for almost thirty years.

“Victim of domestic violence” means a person protected under this act and shall include any person who is 18 years of age or older or who is an emancipated minor and who has been subject to domestic violence by … any other person who is a present or former household member….. “Victim of domestic violence” also includes any person who has been subject to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship. [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d)].

Taken on its face, “former household member” includes a person who shared a household at any time in his or her life, regardless of the time that has elapsed since, or the nature of the party’s current relationship, or various other factors. However, it is well-settled that “former household member” may not be read so broadly. See Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 283 N.J.Super. 17, 20 (App.Div.1995) (rejecting facial reading of “former household member” and finding no jurisdiction); Sisco v. Sisco, 296 N.J.Super. 245, 248-49 (Ch.Div.1996) (following Jutchenko and finding no jurisdiction). Cf. Tribuzio v. Roder, 356 N.J.Super. 590 (App.Div.2003) (rejecting facial reading of “person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship,” but finding jurisdiction); Sperling v. Teplitsky, 294 N.J.Super. 312, 321 (Ch.Div.1996) (following Jutchenko, and finding no jurisdiction in case of former dating relationship). The rejection of a facial reading of the statute rests initially on the premise that domestic violence – the focus of the Act – is “a pattern of abuse or controlling behavior which is injurious to the victim.” Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J.Super. 47, 52 (App.Div.1995). Not all acts of violence between former household members implicate that pattern of abuse or controlling behavior. Thus, the court in Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, supra, 283 N.J.Super. at 20, held that the Act did not apply to alleged domestic violence between two middle-aged brothers. Although they were, technically, former household members, they had not lived in the same household for twenty years. Jurisdiction did not lie, “at least in the absence of any showing that the alleged perpetrators’ past domestic relationship with the alleged victim provides a special opportunity for ‘abuse and controlling behavior.’ ” Ibid. ( quoting Peranio v. Peranio, supra, 280 N.J.Super. at 52). In a closely analogous case involving whether jurisdiction rested on a former dating relationship, the Appellate Division held that “[t]he ultimate issue is whether … the victim was, at the time of the precipitating event, subject to potential abusive and controlling behavior related to and arising out of the past domestic relationship.” Tribuzio v. Roder, supra, 356 N.J.Super. 590, 597 (App.Div.2003). The Jutchenko and Tribuzio formulations differ subtly. Jutchenko looks forward in time, and focuses on whether the former relationship “provides a special opportunity” for domestic violence – thus triggering the need for protection and prevention in the future. Tribuzio to some extent looks backward, and focuses on whether the domestic violence was related to and arose out of the past domestic relationship. The approaches are complementary. Either kind of case can implicate the Act’s remedial goals. Put another way, a court must inquire whether the parties have been so entangled, emotionally or physically – or they will be in the future – that the court should invoke the Act to protect the plaintiff and prevent future violence. To resolve the jurisdictional question, the court in Tribuzio v. Roder held that mere passage of time is not enough to determine jurisdiction:The passage of time from the end of the dating relationship is only one factor to be considered in determining the availability of the Act’s protection. The extent and nature of any intervening contacts as well as the nature of the precipitating incident must also be considered… A qualitative analysis is required, weighing and balancing the nature and duration of the prior relationship, the intervening contacts, the nature of the precipitating event, and any other appropriate factors. [356 N.J.Super. at 597]. Among “other appropriate factors” that courts have considered is the likelihood of ongoing contact. Thus, in Sperling v. Teplitsky, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 320, a case involving a former dating relationship, the court declined jurisdiction where “such persons can reasonably expect that there will be no need for them ever to come in contact.” By contrast, the court in Storch v. Sauerhoff, 334 N.J.Super. 226, 234-35 (Ch.Div.2000), found jurisdiction based on the “hybrid of two jurisdictional grounds: ‘present household member’ and ‘former household member,’ ” where the parties had to “interact on a frequent basis.” This is consistent with the notion expressed in Jutchenko that the relationship must create a “special opportunity” for abuse. In summary, based on the foregoing, there are at least six factors to consider in determining whether jurisdiction lies in a former relationship case:

(1) the nature and duration of the prior relationship;(2) whether the past domestic relationship provides a special opportunity for abuse and controlling behavior;(3) the passage of time since the end of the relationship;(4) the extent and nature of any intervening contacts; (5) the nature of the precipitating incident; and (6) the likelihood of ongoing contact or relationship. In weighing the above factors, a court should find that proof of a close and long-lasting relationship, as opposed to a short-lived and casual one, tends to support jurisdiction. As the court concluded in Jutchenko, if the past relationship provides no opportunity for violence, that would also weigh against jurisdiction. Thus, in Sisco v. Sisco, supra, 296 N.J.Super. at 246-47, 249, the court found no jurisdiction over an adult daughter’s complaint against her father, from whom she was once estranged, but then reconciled, where the parties lived independently of each other, and the plaintiff alleged an assault arising out of an argument involving the care of another family member. On the other hand, jurisdiction was found in Storch v. Sauerhoff, supra, 334 N.J.Super. at 234, where the court found that “the parties … have a long standing familial and emotional relationship which the plaintiff alleges has been characterized by controlling and verbal abuse. ”A short hiatus between the end of the relationship and the present incident favors the jurisdictional claim. Compare Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, supra, 283 N.J.Super. at 20 (jurisdiction rejected where hiatus was twenty years) and Sisco v. Sisco, supra, 296 N.J.Super. at 249 (jurisdiction rejected where hiatus was fifteen years), with Tribuzio v. Roder, supra, 356 N.J.Super. at 597 (jurisdiction found where hiatus was three years). But see Storch v. Sauerhoff, supra, 334 N.J.Super. at 234-35 (jurisdiction found despite a nineteen-year hiatus, although court grounded its decision on a finding that a hybrid of both present and former household relationship existed). Business contacts are less significant than family or domestic-related contacts. See Sperling v. Teplitsky, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 316, 321 (no jurisdiction where defendant kicked plaintiff’s current boyfriend’s car over business dispute unrelated to plaintiff). Also, more numerous contacts strengthen the jurisdictional claim. See Tribuzio v. Roder, supra, 356 N.J.Super. at 597 (jurisdiction established where “unwanted contacts … were frequent and their nature demonstrated a continuing emotional attachment on defendant’s part and an effort to control plaintiff’s behavior and to harass her”). Intervening contacts marked by violence or threats also strengthen the jurisdictionalclaim, and absence of violence weakens it. See Sperling v. Teplitsky, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 321 (no jurisdiction where only one contact between plaintiff and defendant since end of dating relationship in late 1991 and incident January 1996). If the precipitating incident relates to the domestic relationship, then jurisdiction is more appropriate than if the precipitating incident had no connection to a domestic setting or relationship. Compare Tribuzio v. Roder, supra, 356 N.J.Super. at 597 (jurisdiction established where contacts related to prior dating relationship), with Sperling v. Teplitsky, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 316, 320 (incident related to defendant’s business dealings with plaintiff’s current boyfriend). The likelihood of ongoing contact favors jurisdiction.

NOTE: Adwokat / Prawnik Pawel Kostro mowi po polsku.

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